Haoshui Yu,
Freshman at University of California, Irvine majoring in Economics.
January 15th, 2024
Published September 5th, 2024
Intro to Quantum Tech
Quantum technology has been the type surrounding the computer science field. However, the intricacies of quantum computation are often difficult to discern. San Francisco bureau chief of MIT Technology Review, Martin Giles, explains that quantum computation significantly differs from status quo computers which use “bits—a stream of electrical or optical pulses representing 1s or 0s” (Giles 2019). Qubits refer to “subatomic particles such as electrons or photons” which can be manipulated by using lasers to exploit the strange properties of qubits (Giles 2019). Though similar, the distinction between qubits and bits is more than just two letters.
Through utilizing qubits, it grants quantum computers an “ability to simultaneously be in multiple states [of 0s and 1s]” which is known as superposition (Giles 2019). The reason behind the global pursuit of quantum technology is because “a quantum computer with several qubits in superposition can crunch through a vast number of potential outcomes simultaneously” (Giles 2019).
To simplify the technical jargon, quantum computers can be understood as an algorithm where a computer can simultaneously declare code as both 0s and 1s. As a result, it adds additional sophistication to decryption and encryption processes.
Xi’s Development
Beyond Xi’s historical regional ambitions, empirics suggest that China is actively pursuing quantum technology in the status quo. A former Research Fellow for Cybersecurity, Intelligence, and Emerging Technologies in the Border, Dustin Carmack, suggests Security and Immigration Center at The Heritage Foundation “China has identified quantum capabilities as a mission-critical technology for its economic and national security measures” (Carmack 2023). To meet this end, Xi has “pledged … to fund an estimated $15.3 billion in quantum R&D” (Carmack 2023). Recently, Chinese physicists “claim to have constructed two quantum computers with performance speeds faster than Google’s 54-qubit Sycamore processor: the Jiuzhang 2.0 and the Zuchongzhi 2.0.66”; to put that into perspective, it “can calculate in one millisecond a task that would otherwise take the world’s fastest conventional computer 30 trillion years to process” (Carmack 2023). Despite these claims, the researchers from China haven’t released their methods and data from said research. As a result, whether China has successfully created an early version of quantum technology remains unknown. In fact, it may be likely that China falsely made these claims in order to garner international leverage or to secure nationalist sentiments in China as researchers Sanzeri and Hannum illustrated is a typical tendency of Xi’s. However, the possibility itself is a significant threat to be delt with.
Some may suggest that Chinese quantum technology may not be used for its militaristic ends; although that possibility exists, the question about Chinese intent is irrelevant in contrast to the perception of superior Chinese military capacity. I would agree with some contemporary IR scholars that if American allies and adversaries perceived a decrease in American military supremacy, that is sufficient for allies and adversaries to change their behaviors which would begin a gradual destabilizing transition away from current unipolarity.
Although Quantum technologies have applications in a multitude of fields, it presents the most significant changes in the form of quantum cryptography. Quantum technology is said to be able to fundamentally alter the security of telecommunications and any digital infrastructures (Herman and butler 2021). What’s worse, Herman and Butler make a comparative claim where “quantum computer attacks, whose effects would be far more protracted and far worse than those of a conventional cyberattack,” which could offset geopolitical balance of powers (Herman and Butler 2021). Specifically, “quantum computers will be used to disrupt service to critical financial cyber-systems” where major attacks “could cost up to nearly $2 Trillion” (Sanzeri 2022). 2 trillion dollars presents a tremendous amount of wealth that can substantially inhibit American global primacy and soft power. Given the geopolitical and financial power of quantum attacks, it is likely that if China reached quantum maturity, it would dramatically alter the status quo geopolitical construct.
Critics would suggest that quantum technology cannot be developed in the short term. An assistant professor at the Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, Jon Lindsay, suggest there is “no compelling evidence exists that quantum computers can be usefully applied to computing problems of interest to the Air Force” due to technological constraints in computational qubits (Lindsay 2020). The research of American theoretical condensed matter physicist, Sankar Das Sarma, who published through MIT Tech Review, says “The most advanced quantum computers today have dozens of decohering (or “noisy”) physical qubits. Building a quantum computer that could crack RSA codes out of such components would require many millions” (Das Sarma 2022). It is likely that the critics such as Das Sarma and Lindsay are correct that quantum technology development will not bare revolutionary impacts in the status quo; however, that doesn’t deny the limitless potential of quantum technologies in the future.
Emerging Threats
Given the emergence of quantum technology, China may garner the ability to radically change people’s lives and even the geopolitics in the of the world. Even without quantum computers, American citizens are often plagued by low level cybercrime and data leaks. According to Ani Petrosyan, Researcher at Statista, “the number of data compromises in the United States stood at 1802 cases… over 422 million individuals were affected” in the year 2022 alone (Petrosyan 2023). Although not all of these hacks are attributed to China and none of these were major compromises of national security, these were examples of simple cybercrime which compromised much information from Americans. If China gained quantum technology much can go awry. We can be certain that data compromises will dramatically increase because the cybersecurity of basic companies will not be able to withstand the strength of quantum cyberattacks. However, the question isn’t whether or how China may use quantum technology; instead, the primary concern is the perception of allies and adversaries. Under the lens of hegemonic theory, once China acquires superior capabilities to rival America, it can create arms races, miscalculation, allied proliferation, and even possibly direct clashes (Brands 2015; Anderson 2019; Reich 2017).
Some may suggest that quantum isn’t as transformative as these scholars would imagine, other experts would disagree. First of all, quantum computers present the ability to completely destroy a grid regardless of different modes of encryption, that can devastate civilian infrastructure, telecommunications, and cost up to billions or even trillions without even accounting network repairs (Sanzeri 2022). An attack like that is more than sufficient to fundamentally destroy the American economy. Deductively speaking, an economy is a prerequisite to trade and supply-chains, which are basic necessities to supply military materials and weapons; thus, a major cyberattack at scale can directly impact American military strength. Second, it may expose military secrets. According to Director of the Centre for Security Studies at the University of Hull, David Lonsdale, says “Strikes against enemy nuclear forces and their command and control, in conjunction with active ballistic missile defenses (BMD), would help ensure damage limitation,” and “increases in accuracy and remote sensing have enhanced the potency of counterforce options” (Lonsdale 2019). Thus, if basic information like the location and type of nuclear arms are exposed to China, they can easily launch a strategic first strike on American territory to undermine second strike capabilities and win the war before it even starts. However, this scenario is not very likely because no nation can ever be fully confident that they know where every single adversarial nuclear system is; so, moral uncertainty will still provide a deterring effect. Despite that limitation, such a scenario isn’t unlikely either because the perception that China possesses the ability to first strike American nuclear capabilities and undermine second strike may prompt America to strike China first. Thus, the bind in perception goes both ways which may worsen tensions and cause miscalculation. Third, retired rear admiral from the Royal Navy with thirty-six years’ service, John Gower believes “fog of crisis… made more impenetrable by misinformation and cyber…” and it may be “perceived to be a nuclear first strike” which can spark conflict (Gower 2018). However, these contemporary scholars are only discussing cyberattacks in context of existing technology. None of it accounts for the unparalleled calculative power that quantum computation brings forth. Thus, it is clear that quantum technology presents perhaps an even superior transformation to modern military power than the introduction of nuclear powers because of their ability to bring devastation but also their ability to undermine conventional forms of deterrence.
In addition to these concerns, an under evaluated transformation makes quantum computation even deadlier: cryptocurrency. According to multiple economics and business researchers who published through Journal of Industrial and Business Economics, Giudici et. al., cryptocurrencies have “growing popularity around the world” (Giudici et. al. 2019). Cryptocurrencies are constructed from an online distributed ledger known as a blockchain. Adam Hayes, a PhD professional in economics and sociology, explains that a “blockchain is a distributed database or ledger shared among a computer network's nodes. They are best known for their crucial role in cryptocurrency systems for maintaining a secure and decentralized record of transactions” (Hayes 2023). However, Brandon Rodenburg and Stephen P. Pappas, both PhD holders from Princeton University in physics suggest “any aspect of a blockchain… that uses public/private key cryptography, whether it be in information exchange between parties or in digital signatures, a quantum computer may be able to break the security of the encryption” (Rodenburg and Pappas 2017). In addition, Rodenburg and Pappas elaborates that “content that is signed may be forged by a suitably equipped intermediary” using a quantum computer at full maturity, and “any encrypted communications used… [is] vulnerable” (Rodenburg and Pappas 2017). Given the prevailing trends of switching to digital currencies like Bitcoin, a successful major cyberattack will go beyond the damages of 2 trillion as indicated by Sanzeri; instead, it can potentially shock and destroy the entire digital market system. Thus, those who possess powerful quantum technology can control the tides of economic trade and hold tremendous leverage over other countries.
Given these unique characteristics of quantum technology, the perception of Chinese acquisition can potentially destabilize the world through a multitude of mechanisms illustrated above. Under the premise of hegemonic theory, it would lead to a series of transitional wars and proliferation events in emerging technology with similar patterns with early developments of nuclear weapons.
Justifying Hegemonic Theory
Hegemony describes a system of unipolarity where a certain state, America in this case, possesses tremendous military capabilities to stabilize the world predominantly through avoiding allied proliferation, combating adversaries, intervening to stabilize relations, and more (Brands 2015). However, a core premise of hegemony is reliant on the US being the most powerful actor. Although hegemony does have the potential ability to stabilize the international arena, some scholars like Barry Posen, Ford International Professor of Political Science at MIT, criticize hegemony for the risk of causing adversarial counterbalancing most notably from China and Russia. Professor of International Politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, Daniel Drezner, supplements Brands’s claims with robust historical evidence by concluding “the leading state’s power advantage removes the problem of hegemonic rivalry from world politics” (Drezner 2013). Although Professor Drezner does use a series of analysis from the cold war era, that research doesn’t necessarily assume changes from the 21st century with a greater economic interconnectivity, deadlier weapons, and new frontiers of warfare like cyber. However, Professor Posen uses present behaviors of China who “has used its position in the U.N. Security Council to slow U.S.-led efforts to pressure Iran” and even “U.S. allies in Europe have done what they can to punch up the capacity of the European Union for independent foreign policy action” (Posen 2014). Thus, even if Professor Drezner’s study is more holistic, it may not be as applicable to modern Chinese behaviors. That being said, Jacob Shapiro, the Director of Analysis for Geopolitical Futures (GPF), suggest that although the present world order experiences difficult challenges by China and Russia, that zero-sum competition would be dramatically amplified under multipolarity because every nation would have the incentive to expand (Anderson 2019). Despite the muddled debate between the power to stabilize the world, Professor in the Division of Global Affairs at Rutgers University, Simon Reich, provides a unique perspective. Reich theorizes that much of contemporary hegemonic theory analysis “consistently ignore a wealth of economic data” because “American military capacity cannot be equated with hegemony” (Reich 2017). Professor Reich further posits that conditions like American debt, reliance on foreign actors for manufacturing, and lieu of military mistakes like “the Korean War, the Bay of Pigs Invasion, Vietnam, and more recently, failed interventions in Lebanon, Somalia, Afghanistan and Iraq” all clearly illustrate the failing attributes of American hegemony (Reich 2017). In agreement with Professor Reich, Christopher Fettweis, of the Department of Political Science in Tulane University, concur that hegemonic stability is a sham because US cut spending by nearly 100 billion from 1990 to 1998 but no conflicts occurred (Fettweis 2011). Some would object to that study by saying that no conflicts occurred because America was dramatically more powerful than other nations at the time. However, Fettweis’s study suggests “[t]he world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces” (Fettweis 2011). Thus, strong empirical evidence, alternative explanations, and a litany of military failures suggests that one should be skeptical to make an overarching claim about hegemonic stability theory, and that there is likely an insignificant correlation between global peace and hegemony. Gordon Adams, Professor Emeritus of International Relations at American University, says “Other militaries are rising—China, India most obviously, but also a host of Southeast and East Asian militaries” (Adams 17). Thus, given the inability for hegemony to credibly and consistently deter adversaries, it is likely that a multipolar world order would be more peaceful.
Despite the apparent instability created in a hegemonic system, scholars must also evaluate the risks associated with a transition process. Given the historical events that culminated in American hegemony, it is likely difficult to completely transition away from the present geopolitical system. Professor Noel Anderson in the Department of Political Science at the University of Toronto suggest the result of a decline in American military power leads to “proliferation of interventions by otherwise weak states in civil wars across the globe” (Anderson 19). In agreement with Anderson, Paul Pillar, Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Center for Security Studies at Georgetown University, says shifting to “multipolarity… exacerbates security dilemmas and arms races, in ways that extend beyond great powers to middle-level ones” (Pillar 18). Michael Beckley, Assistant professor of political science at Tufts, elucidates that lack of American military hegemony can directly cause allied “[a]rms buildups, insecure sea-‐lanes, and closed markets” and indirectly undercut American leadership which would undermine efforts to combat “warming, water scarcity, and disease” (Beckley 2012). Various experts conclude hegemony is necessary to limit incentives to proliferate nuclear weapons and undermine cooperation. On the contrary, Paul MacDonald, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College, and Joseph M. Parent, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami, believe “declining great powers demonstrate more caution and restraint in the use of force” which led them to “refrain from initiating and escalating military disputes” (MacDonald and Parent 11). Similar to their conclusion, Joseph Bafumi Professor of Government at Dartmouth College & Professor of Political Science at University of Miami, and Joseph M. Parent reached a similar conclusion a year later from an analysis of American domestic culture; they believe that after a decline in American military superiority, the domestic population are likely to go against American decisions to expand abroad. Thus, avoiding full scale confrontation. In response to concerns about lash-out from past grievances, Douglas B. Atkinson, Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science and International Affairs and George W. Williford, Ph.D. Student at The University of Georgia in Political Science say, “great powers that retrench may be able to avoid predatory attacks” (Atkinson and Williford 2016). Hence, great powers like China will likely not be overly committed to destroying a United States that has scaled down its military. Although America will likely not be successful in clinging onto hegemony, the transition away from American hegemony will likely cause conflict. Even if a world dominated by American unipolarity is an imperfect world, the allies that rely on the America for military protection would then have no protection to turn to, forcing them to proliferate weapons and conduct arms races to expand their military capacity. This dynamic seems particularly dangerous in application to Chinese acquisition of stronger emerging technology; Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan are all very reliant on American military protection, where Japan has quite literally structured their defense articles off American security. Given the historical grievances between these countries and China, it seems unlikely China will be willing to assimilate them into a new world order which may lead to allied proliferation of arms.
The Influence of Militaristic Perception
Although quantum development will likely result in destabilization through dramatic alterations to modern balance of power, it is also likely that the development of quantum technology itself has destabilizing risks as well. Jason Healey, Senior Research Scholar and adjunct faculty at Columbia University’s School for International and Public Affairs and president of the Cyber Conflict Studies Association, suggest that American policy makers are interpreting cyber related risks through a militaristic lens which may open up vulnerabilities for adversaries to “get in a sucker punch] on the U.S. before Cyber Command can bring its big guns to bear” (Healey 2020). America’s power hungry and security focused cyber policies may open more vulnerabilities instead of protecting national interests. Furthermore, the drive to be ahead of our adversaries may prompt other countries to miscalculate instead. In agreement with this argument, Robert Lee, active-duty USAF Cyber Warfare Operations Officer and Thomas Rid, Professor of Strategic Studies and founding director of the Alperovitch Institute for Cybersecurity Studies at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies, believe when “military and industry leaders are consequently able to make wild claims without providing evidence” it would have an “escalatory effect” (Lee and Rid 2014). These cyber operations may not garner their intended strategic uses; instead, they can be counterproductive to the broader security goal in mind. Joe Burton, Associate Lecturer in the School of International Relations at the University of St Andrews and George Christou, Associate Professor of European Politics in the Department of Politics and International Studies at the University of Warwick, illustrate this and further establish “the centralization and nationalization of cyber-security strategies… have not been a good fit for asymmetric network-based threats” (Burton and Christou 21). In fact, these efforts can create possible “security dilemmas —where defensive measures are perceived by other actors as offensive” (Burton and Christou 21). Even if American policy makers only advanced domestic cyber resilience and attribution technologies, adversaries may still perceive these abilities as dangerous or used to fuel a hostile agenda, especially in a time of ongoing Ukrainian war and heightened tensions. Thus, if America asymmetrically advanced its quantum technology, it would likely propagate an arms race between US, China, and possibly other regional hegemons. Even if nation-states don’t misperceive each other’s intent, Jenny Jun, a research fellow at the Center for Security and Emerging Technology, believes these defensive initiatives undermines mutual vulnerability of major assets which may undermine strategic stability. In response to these defensive cyber developments, China may either enhance its offensive cyber capabilities or enhance its defensive abilities. If they choose to improve offensive capabilities, then that will inscribe fear within the US and lead to an arms race. If China chooses to develop defensive abilities, it restarts the cycle where American policy makers may misperceive their intent. Regardless, the elusive potential of cyberattacks makes it a risky endeavor for both China and the US. According to hegemonic stability theory, there are likely two options to avoid escalatory conflict: the US continuously stays ahead of China by constantly innovating new quantum technologies, or US and China sustain a balance of cyber capabilities to maintain deterrence.
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